This paper combines panel data on employment and investment in different types of capital good in Northern Ireland with timeseries data on the level of political conflict (measured in various ways) in order to estimate the extent to which conflict discourages employment and investment of different kinds.
Introduction
There has been violent political conflict in Northern Ireland for over 30 years , making the Troubles one of the longest-running low-intensity conflicts in the World. Over the last 30 years there has been substantial variation in the magnitude of the conflict, as measured by, for example, the t otal number of politically related deaths and injuries in the Province. Since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement there has been some reduction in the intensity of the conflict, prompting speculation about the potential size of a Northern Irish "peace dividend".
Given the length of the conflict, and the relative abundance of economic data for Northern Ireland, there have been surprisingly few quantitative studies on the impact of political violence on economic activity, and (to our knowledge) no econometric work of any kind. Existing estimates of the size of the peace dividend are therefore highly speculative. In this paper we will plug a gap in the literature by directly estimating elasticities of manufacturing investment and employment with respect to the intensity of the conflict. Although this is not by itself enough to estimate the potential economic consequences of the peace (which depend also on activity in the substantial public and private service sectors), it is surely an essential component in the calculation.
Our results are also relevant to a second issue. Economic activity (including manufacturing activity) in Northern Ireland has received very generous investment and employment subsidies over the past three decades. A great deal of attention has been paid to this system, and to its reform (see for example Clulow and Teague, 1993; Hart, 1993; Hamilton, 1996) . One important factor in determining an economically efficient set of subsidies will be the extent to which the conflict has led to reductions in different factor inputs. It will be important to know which types of input are the worst affected by the violence, and therefore the ones most deserving subsidies on economic grounds. Our paper will provide some evidence relevant to this issue by estimating the extent to which the impact of violence varies across different factors of production.
The next section provides an overview of the Northern Irish economy during the period of the conflict. This informs the econometric model presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Economic Performance in Northern Ireland
Summary statistics for the Northern Ireland economy present a mixed picture. On the one hand, the rate of growth of real GDP for recent years has outstripped the UK average. The average annual growth rate for Northern Ireland over 1985-94 was 3.4%, as compared with 2.4% for the UK as a whole. For the manufacturing sector the contrast is even greater, with figures of 7.5% and 1.3%.
1 However, the level of per capita GDP in Northern Ireland i s still only 80% of the UK average (Birnie and Hitchens, 1999) . argue that the rate of convergence implicit in such figures is lower than the average international convergence rates estimated in cross-country growth models. In other words, Northern Ireland is not catching up with
Britain as quickly as one might expect. The under-performance of the Northern
Ireland economy might be due to a variety of proximate causes:
1. Factor inputs. The Northern Ireland unemployment rate (13.0% in 1995) has been persistently higher than the UK average (8.8% in 1995) . On the other hand several studies indicate that Northern Ireland manufacturing investment rates are no lower than the UK average (Harris, 1983; Henry, 1989; Hitchens et al., 1990; Birnie, 1993, 1994) , and that they have at times been higher. This explains the fact that there has been some convergence, however limited. But the Northern Irish economy has become increasingly manufacturing intensive -as indicated by the growth rates above -while the British economy that has become less manufacturing intensive. So marginally higher manufacturing investment rates in the province do not represent better underlying economic performance. Bradley and McCartan (1998). productivity in 1987 was 77% that of the UK as a whole. In no sub-sector was productivity higher in the province than in Britain.
To summarise: employment performance and labour productivity in Northern Ireland are worse than in Britain; investment is not much higher, and capital productivity is lower. Per capita GDP in the province is lower than the UK average, and is not converging on this average very quickly. These stylised facts suggest that Northern
Ireland faces an aggregate production function (and hence labour and capital demand curves) that lies below Britain's.
To what extent can this be explained by the Troubles? Rowthorn (1981) suggests that the conflict might reduce factor productivity, and therefore employment and investment, by degradation of the capital stock in attacks on property. Perhaps more importantly, the violence could also reduce investment (and eventually employment) through increased uncertainty about the returns to investing in Northern Irish industry. As the intensity of conflict increases the perceived probability of a major escalation of violence, in which production is severely disrupted, might also increase. If it is impossible to insure against such risks fully, or if there is investment hysteresis (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) , then firms will be more cautious in their investment decisions.
The size of this effect could have been exacerbated by the fact that a large number of plants in Northern Ireland in the 1970s were part of firms based outside the province (mostly in Britain). Hamilton (1993) Several studies have sought to quantify the magnitude of such effects on manufacturing employment. These include Rowtho rn (1981), Canning et al. (1987) and Rowthorn and Wayne (1988) . Perotti (1993) explain cross-country investment variations by using a "sociopolitical instability index" constructed by principal components analysis. The important factors in the index are indicators of the absence of democracy and the incidence of political violence. Both Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and de Haan and Si ermann (1996) discover similar results. Fedderke and Liu (1999) and Fielding (1999) Figure 1 illustrates the investment and employment series. In some of the sectors the series exhibit a marked deterministic trend, but in all of them there is substantial variation over the sample period.
[ Figure 1 here]
Our aim is to quantify the extent to which this variation is due to the Troubles by [ Figure 2 here]
Time-series properties of the data
Before proceeding to estimation of the investment-employment model, we need to ascertain the order of integration of each time-series listed in Table 1 below. Unit root tests are reported in Table 2 . Sample sizes for the test are noted in the table. They differ 
0.000 0 X from one variable to another due to differences in data availability. We have sectorspecific observations for the three dependent variables in our model, so we employ the t-bar panel unit root test of Im et al. (1998) , which allows for sectoral heterogeneity.
The null that the investment series are I(1) can be rejected against the alternative that they are I(0) around sector-specific linear trends at the 1% level. The t -statistic for employment lies almost exactly on the 5% confidence interval. We will treat the series as trend-stationary.
For the other variables (which do not vary across sectors) we employ the standard ADF test. Because in such a small sample ADF critical values are sensitive to the DGP assumed under the null, we simulate our own critical values. The p-values reported are tests of the hypothesis that ρ = 0 in the regression:
where y t represents each of the variables in Table 2 and the lag order T is determined by the Schwartz Criterion. The distributions on which the p-values are based are constructed on 10,000 replications under the null DGP:
The null can be rejected at the 5% level in all cases except that of p f , where the significance level is about 8%. We will treat all the variables as trend-stationary, though the t-values associated with p f , in Section 3.3 ought to be treated with some caution.
The estimated model 5
Using the data discussed above, we have observations for five sectors and (after taking lags) 29 years; so we have 145 observations on sector s in year t. The model estimated is a panel VAR for machinery and equipment investment (I M ), construction investment (I B ) and employment (N), conditional on (i) economic cost variables (vector Z) and (ii) the political conflict variables (vector P) discussed in section 3.1 5 All the results reported in this section were produced using TSP 4.4.
and listed in Table 1 above. 6 Lags up to order 2 are included in the model:
Appendix 1 shows how this representation is consistent with an aggregate model based on a profit-maximising representative firm. Each parameter in the model is to be interpreted as an average elasticity across the five sectors. Any cross-sector heterogeneity in the slope parameters in the model could potentially induce autocorrelation in the residuals u t s , biasing the estimates of these averages. In such a case some correction would be required (Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Zhao and Pesaran, 1998) . We proceed on the assumption of no autocorrelation; this assumption will be tested in due course. α(L), β(L) and γ(L) are lag operators. The theoretical model indicates that elements of α(L) should be positive and elements of β(L) (or at least the corresponding long-run coefficients) should be negative. We anticipate that elements of γ(L) will also be negative: an increase in the total number of politically related fatalities will reduce investment demand and possibly also employment; so too will the number of fatalities per violent incident.
All variables in the model have been de-trended. Each dependent variable in the X vector has been de-trended using sector-specific intercepts and trends, so we have in effect a within-groups estimator.
7 Note that contemporaneous values of the economic cost variables are excluded from the model, because no appropriate instruments are available.
u t s is a (3 x 1) vector of residuals for each sector s in each year t. There is no a priori restriction on the covariance matrix for the 15 residual time series (three factors of production, five sectors). The system represented by equation (2) is estimated as a Seemingly Unrelated Regression with 15 equations and parameter equality restrictions across the five sectors. We do however assume that there is no autocorrelation in the residual time series; tests of this hypothesis are reported below. Because there is a substantial amount of autocorrelation in some of the explanatory variables, t -ratios on many individual lags are quite small, so the individual coefficients are difficult to interpret. For this reason Table 3 
This test assumes that any residual autocorrelation is common across sectors. The second does not make this assumption, and tests for the significance of the 15 elements of θ s in the regression: Neither test statistic is significant at the 10% level. 
Results of Estimation
The statistically significant coefficients in Table 3 are consistent with economic theory and with our priors about the impact of political conflict on economic activity:
(i) Higher real labour costs reduce both employment and investment; in fact, the estimated equilibrium impact of an increase in the wage (coefficient 2) is greater for investment than it is for employment. A 1% increase in the wage i s estimated to reduce investment in machinery and equipment by about 3.4%, construction investment by about 2.5% and employment by about 1%.
(ii) Higher fuel prices also reduce employment and investment. A 1% increase in fuel prices is estimated to reduce investment in machinery and equipment by about 1.9%, construction investment by about 3.7% and employment by about 0.7%. There is no evidence that the intensity of conflict has a differential impact on investment in different types of capital. There are no significant differences in either the direct effects (coefficient 1) or the equilibrium effects (coefficient 2). There is no support from the Northern Ireland data for the hypothesis that construction investment is especially sensitive to measure of the intensity of conflict. However, the estimated effects on investment are several times greater than those on employment. Basing our calculations on the coefficient 2 column, a 1% increase in total fatalities reduces the capital-labour ratio by about 0.6%; a 1% increase in the number of fatalities per violent incident reduces the capital-labour ratio by about 1%. As a consequence, labour productivity and wages are likely to fall. With more frequently reported data on wages it might be possible to estimate the magnitude of this effect.
The sample period we are using contains very few years in which the number of fatalities is anywhere near zero, so it would be inappropriate to use the results here 
Summary and Conclusion
Panel data estimates of the determinants of investment and employment in the Northern Ireland manufacturing sector indicate that variations in the intensity of the political conflict have a large and significant impact on economic activity. The impact on investment is greater than the impact on employment, as one would expect if the sunk-cost element of investment decisions is greater than that of employment decisions. However, there is no significant difference between the impact on construction investment and that on equipment investment.
Investment and employment in any given year are affected both by the total number of casualties in the conflict and by the average size of violent incidents in that year. In other words, a few large incidents have more impact than many small ones.
From an economic point of view, a single incident like Bloody Sunday or the Omagh bombing causes more damage than many small violent incidents leading to the same number of fatalities. Changes in conflict intensity from one year to the next have an immediate effect on investment and employment. Our results i ndicate that the increase in manufacturing activity resulting from a permanent cessation of all violence is likely to be substantial and to happen very quickly. For reasons discussed above, however, it would be imprudent to use our estimates to calculate a categorical figure for the peace dividend.
To the extent that the reductions in investment and employment are a response to uninsurable risks associated with upturns in the intensity of political conflict, the results here indicate an economic rationale for the substantial subsidies enjoyed by Northern Irish industry. The fact that investment is far more greatly affected than employment suggests that investment subsidies have a much more robust economic justification than employment subsidies.
Appendix 1
In this appendix we derive the model used in Section 3.3; this is an extension of the model described by Rama (1993) . There are two types of capital investment in the model: nonresidential construction (B) and machinery / equipment (M). The optimal level for each type of capital is that which maximises the growth in the value of the representative firm, Π. Π is given by:
where Q t is the firm's output at t, P t the price of this output, W t wages, N t employment, P t Neither the first nor the last term in equation (A1) is dependent on current investment, and will not affect the maximisation problem. Defining these terms as z t , we can write:
The stock of the i th type of capital is related to gross investment by the following law of motion:
δ is the rate of capital depreciation. Substituting equation (A3) into equation (A2):
where C i t is the user cost of capital net of a capital gains term:
In order to derive a tractable solution for the optimal capital stock, we will assume that output is a log-linear function of employment and the firm's stock of each type of capital.
We introduce adjustment costs by allowing output to depend negatively on the rate of growth of capital (productivity is lower when new capital is being installed). It is possible that the same type of costs could also apply to labour, so that workers are less productive during a period of expansion of the workforce, and output is lower during the expansion:
The parameter restrictions embody neoclassical assumptions. We will also allow demand for the firm's output to depend negatively on its relative price. Substituting equation (A6) into equation (A4) we have:
Maximising Π with respect to k
, N t+1 and Y t+1 yields the following solutions for k i t+1 , expressed in logarithms:
where σ = [α + β + γ + ζ − φ − ω − ψ] 
In other words, the optimal capital stock and employment levels are log-linear functions of the real user cost of each type of capital, the real wage rate, the real fuel price, the existing stock of each type of capital and the existing level of employment. Equations (A8-A10) are of the general form: We have data only on gross investment, not the net capital stock. The two are related by the equation:
and hence:
We will assume that this equation has a logarithmic approximation of the form: 
With Rational Expectations, the differences between E[x t ] and x t will be entirely random, so we can write: If the lag order on all right-hand-side variables is restricted to two, then the system can be represented by equation (2) 
